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THE LAWYER'S OBLIGATION TO BE
TRUSTWORTHY WHEN DEALING WITH
OPPOSING PARTIES
GEOFFREY

C. HAZARD, JR.*

It is desirable that lawyers be trustworthy in dealing with
opposing parties.lit is impractical, however, to go very far in formulating rules of professional conduct that require lawyers to be
trustworthy.
I. DEFINING TERMS

At the outset, some definition of terms may be useful. By
"lawyer" is meant lawyers in the practice of law generally. This
includes lawyers in private practice and in public service, in independent firms and in law departments, in large organizations
and in solo practice; civil and criminal lawyers, specialists and
generalists. Lawyers perform a broad range of functions including counseling and advocacy, but this article focuses on those
functions that concern direct dealings with opposing parties on
behalf of a client.2 In this analysis, the term "vouching lawyer"
* Baker Professor of Law, Yale University. B.A., Swarthmore College, 1953; LL.B.,
Columbia Law School, 1954. Reporter, American Bar Association Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards. This is the text of a lecture prepared for delivery on the
occasion of the Fifth Annual Benjamin Adger Hagood Distinguished Lecture before
members of the South Carolina Bar, Law Faculty, and Students at the South Carolina
Law Center, April 8, 1981.
1. Kutak, Coming: The New Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 66 A.B.A.J. 47,
48 (1980); Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyer's Ethics in Negotations, 35 LA. L. REv. 577
(1975).
2. See, e.g., Meserve, Lawyers in Modern Society, 49 N.Y.S.B.J. 94, 96 (1977); Garrett, The Social Responsibility of Lawyers in their Professional Capacity, 30 U. Mvau
L. REV. 879, 882 (1976).
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refers to a lawyer who is making a representation to an opposing
party.

By "opposing parties" is meant those persons, other than
clients and officials of a tribunal, with whom vouching lawyers
deal during the course of representing clients. Lawyers, of
course, have special duties of trustworthiness in dealing with
tribunals 3 and owe equally exacting and even broader fiduciary
duties to their clients.4 The present analysis focuses on the duty
to opposing parties, not in derogation of vouching lawyers' du-

ties to client and court, but for purposes of clarification. The
analysis presupposes and holds constant these other duties, particularly duties owed to clients. The term "opposing parties" in
its exclusive connotation thus signifies those other than client
and court. In its inclusive connotation, the term specifically refers to persons of adverse interest and their legal counsel, 5 in-

cluding opposite parties in contract or property transactions,
formation of partnerships and corporations, negotiations aimed
at settling litigation, and negotiation and mediation in interper-

sonal, interorganizational, interdepartmental, and political or social controversies of all kinds. Adversary relationships are ubiq-

uitous in modern society, and the participation of lawyers in
defining and transforming adversary relationships is commonplace. Ordinarily, whenever a lawyer acts for a client, a party of

actual or potential opposing interest also exists.
Finally, by "trustworthy" is meant truthfulness in statements made as representations. The definition is limited to
"statements made as representations" because conventions gov-

erning social intercourse do not require strict truthfulness at all
3. See generally ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-102, -103, -106, 108 to -110 (1977).
4. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 4-101 (confidentiality), 5101 to -107 (avoidance of conflicts of interest)(1977).
5. For purposes of this analysis, the term "opposing party" includes the party's lawyer. A lawyer's duty of trustworthiness as regards an opposing party should not vary
according to whether that party has representation. Indeed, the fact that opposing parties have representation generally makes it easier for vouching lawyers to discharge their
own professional obligations. It simplifies communication, for lawyers can communicate
in mutually understood jargon. Also, lawyers can generally assume that an opposing
party is adequately represented and that an adequately represented party has the narrowest latitude for subsequently asserting that the transaction was infected by mistake,
fraud, or other infirmity. The fact that an opposing party is represented by a lawyer,
however, generally changes the potential for effective sanctions against violation of the
duty of trustworthiness.
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times. On the contrary, those conventions give license to make
certain kinds of statements that are literally false.6 Thus, a lawyer is allowed to say at certain stages of negotiation that his client will not offer or accept a specified sum, concession, or interest when, in fact, the client is not intransigent. Indeed, the
lawyer may so describe the client's position when that position
has been taken on the lawyer's advice. A statement that a client
will not offer or accept specified terms thus means only that the
client will not presently accept such terms and instead wants to
extend the risk and cost of nonresolution in the hope of reducing
the price he must pay for resolution. Negotiations can reach a
point of no return, however, when a party's anticipated gain in a
negotiated resolution is less than the anticipated cost of the resolution. When the opposing party's situation begins to approach
that point, it is time for the negotiator to shift from chaffering
to bargaining in earnest. A lawyer's professional skill should indude the ability to project where the points of no return are,
both for his client and for the opposing party. The lawyer must
also have the ability to signal when his statements are to be
taken as representations, that is, when he is vouching for an assertion. Thus, trustworthiness is not simply the moral virtue of
veracity but is an amalgam of moral virtue, market sense, and
physiological and political discernment. It is the ability to understand what truth is, to understand when the truth is called
for, and to instill in others confidence that one has such
understanding.
II.

THE USES OF TRUSTWORTHINESS

If a lawyer is trustworthy, then a statement made as a representation by the lawyer may be taken by an opposing party as
a firm factual component of a transaction. This enables the opposing party to appreciate the situation and recognize what alternative resolutions are practicable. That, in turn, facilitates assessment of the opposing party's interests by the vouching
lawyer's client, thereby further clarifying the available alternatives. In the economist's view, the lawyer's voucher, if accepted

6. See White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation, 1980 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 926, 927.
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as such, reduces transaction costs."
This economizing effect of trustworthiness can be more fully
appreciated upon consideration of the alternative means for verifying the factual components of a transaction. Two alternatives
are available to an opposing party. The party can independently
investigate the factual problem in question or employ someone
else to investigate the situation. For example, a purchaser of real
property can take the word of a seller's lawyer that there are no
liens on the property or can obtain an independent title search.
A party interested in learning the testimony of a key adverse
witness can take the word of the opposing lawyer or can take the
witness' deposition. Clearly, independent investigations will in
many situations be preferred to reliance on the opposing lawyer.
Investigations may be made when there is inadequate confidence
in the particular 'lawyer's trustworthiness or, as in the case of
independent title searches, in accordance with a convention calling for an independent investigation so that a particular lawyer's
trustworthiness will not have to be put to the test.
Nevertheless, independent investigations are costly. The
most definitive-and often costliest-form of independent investigation is a trial. By comparison, the cost of a reliable voucher
may be slight.
The benefits of trustworthiness may be put in loftier terms
by noting that the quality bestows honor upon lawyers in whom
it is embodied. Yet trustworthiness is not only socially esteemed
but also socially useful. It is both esteemed and useful in all social transactions-between politicians, business people, bureaucrats, acquaintances, and spouses. It is generally accepted as a
prime aspect of social maturity.
Trustworthiness is especially useful for lawyers because of
the kinds of transactions into which lawyers are drawn and because of lawyers' peculiar access to the facts. Lawyers are drawn
into situations that have a high element of uncertainty about
what will happen or what has happened-contracts with serious
risk of uncertainties in the future and disputes based on ambiguous evidence of what has occurred in the past. Lawyers are
rarely involved in spot market transactions or circumstances in
which twenty bishops will testify to an event. By contrast, they
7. See, e.g., Williamson, Transaction-CostEconomics: The Governanceof Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & EcoN. 233 (1979).
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are commonly retained in transactions entailing uncertainties
over which the parties may choose to litigate. Holding the stakes
constant, the relative value of vouching as a means of resolving
uncertainties becomes proportionately higher as uncertainty increases. Lawyers' usefulness in vouching to matters that would
otherwise remain uncertain is thus greatest in transactions
whose uncertainties and stakes make the lawyer useful in the
first place."
Lawyers are in a unique position, resulting from their relationships with their clients, to make truthful recommendations
and resolve uncertainties. As spokesmen for their clients' interests, lawyers have peculiar access, arising from the lawyer-client
relationship, to the facts that surround a given transaction.9
First, the client is supposed to give the lawyer the whole truth,
untempered by pride or pretense. This provides the lawyer with
more information than it is ordinarily possible to get under
other circumstances-most if not all of the truth as perceived by
the client. Second, lawyers have access to documentary and
background information and normally to all other sources of information available to their clients. Finally, inquiry is greatly
aided by the guarantee of confidentiality.10 These elements combine to give lawyers a more complete and accurate picture of the
facts than that usually possessed by any other person involved
in a given transaction.
This store of information is a highly useful resource. Strong
justification has been advanced above for making it fully available to opposing parties. A question nevertheless remains whether
the rules of professional conduct should require that this information be made fully available to opposing parties.

III. THE DIscLosuRE PROBLEM
The primary reason why all information available to lawyers
should not be disclosed to opposing parties is that the prospect
of disclosure would impair the lawyer's investigation in the first

8. Consider the role of lawyers in negotiating the settlement that led to the release
of the Americans held hostage by Iran. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1981, § A, at 8, col. 1.
9. The point about a lawyer's peculiar access to the facts was made to me by my
esteemed colleague, Professor Arthur Leff.
10. See Upjohn v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 677, 682 (1981); ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmmrry, EC 4-1 (1977).
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instance. This concern is the basis of rules that protect lawyers
against disclosure of information acquired in representing clients. The attorney-client privilege provides that lawyers may not
be compelled to divulge confidential information supplied by
their clients."" The work-product rule sharply limits the extent
to which an opposing party may compel production of other information acquired by the lawyer in preparation for litigation.12
Finally, lawyers generally may not disclose on their own initiative information relating to the representation of a client except
for the purpose of furthering the client's interests.1 3
The basic rules protecting the confidentiality of information
gathered by lawyers while representing clients are taken as
working premises for the present discussion. Within the framework of these rules, however, it is possible to argue for the proposition that when a lawyer undertakes to act for a client
outside of court, a concurrent duty exists to make full disclosure
of relevant facts known.1 4 In light of the lawyer's duty of candor
inside a courtroom, a question arises whether lawyers should
also be required to be fully candid when speaking for a client
outside of court. Such a requirement would seem to be a true
measure of trustworthiness.
Problems of lawyer trustworthiness can arise in two different contexts. The first, out-of-court transactions to resolve disputes over legal rights, can result in a trial if settlement negotiations fail. The second, out-of-court transactions that
contemplate some type of contract, generally offers no further
alternative if negotiations fail.
Transactions that can go to trial upon the failure of negotiations will be examined first. Debate persists over whether
greater candor should be required in trials.1 5 With regard to disclosure in the forensic setting, the modern rules of discovery 8

11. 101 S. Ct. at 682.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947). Accord, 101 S. Ct. at 686-88.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILITY, DR 4-101 (1977).
See Rubin, supra note 1, at 591.
For a discussion of the benefits and detriments of increased candor before a

tribunal, see Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1031
(1975); Freedman, Judge Frankel's Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1060 (1975);
Uviller, The Advocate, the Truth, and JudicialHackles: A Reaction to Judge Frankel's

Ideas, 123 U. PA. L. Rav. 1067 (1975).
16. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
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expose a considerable portion of lawyers' evidence-gathering to
the opposing party. Furthermore, the rule governing the courtroom requires that any representation of fact, as distinct from a
statement about what someone else asserts as fact, that is made
to the court must be truthful according to the lawyer's knowledge. 17 It has been urged that forensic candor go further. Marvin
Frankel argued while on the bench that advocates should be required to disclose everything they know, perhaps excepting communications from clients.'8 That proposal has failed to attract
support. Dispute also continues concerning whether lawyers
must reveal the fact that their clients' testimony is perjurious
when the lawyer knows that is the fact. It is my view that advocates should, to the following limited extent, vouch for their clients' testimony: they should be obliged to vouch that they have
not violated their own duty to avoid use of fabricated evidence,
even if the evidence is a client's testimony. Conversely, the position is defensible that lawyers should not be required to disclose
their clients' perjury, especially in the case of defendants in
criminal proceedings.' 9
Forensic disclosure, however, is peripheral to the exploration of truthfulness between opposing parties in negotiation.
Trial supplies the factual premises for resolution of a transaction and imposes a resolution based on those premises. Trial is a
costly and stressful alternative that can sometimes be avoided
by negotiations. 20 The event of a trial shows that the less costly
alternative has failed in a particular case.
Trial can thus be viewed as the failure of the parties to stipulate the facts; that is, counsel have been unable to establish the
facts by reciprocal representation and must establish them
through trial. The causes of this failure have been alluded to:
the evidence is not strong enough to enable counsel to induce
the client to authorize concessions, counsel lack the competence
to recognize that the evidence justifies certain concessions, or
one counsel is simply willing to inflict the cost of a trial on the
other side, regardless of the evidence. If any one of these conditions exists, a trial results. But if these conditions exist, it seems

17.
18.
19.
20.

ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-102(A)(5) (1977).
See Frankel, supra note 15, at 1057-59.
See Freedman, supra note 15, at 1063-66.
See 1 M. BELLI, MODERN TRIALS § 109 (1954).
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futile to try to remedy the situation by demanding greater candor at trial. If concessions have not been forthcoming in the relative privacy and repose of pretrial negotiations, what inducements could make them more forthcoming in the more
antagonistic circumstances of a trial?
This analysis suggests that shortfall in voluntary disclosure
at trial is simply a remanifestation of shortfall in voluntary disclosure before trial. Therefore, consideration of the problem of
candor at trial leads to consideration of the problem of trustworthiness in negotiations.
Although negotiations may be categorized as aimed at either
settling legal disputes or trying to consummate deals, these two
categories of negotiations would collapse into a single type were
it not for the availability of a court to which parties could resort
upon failure of negotiations concerning a legal dispute. Consider,
for example, negotiations in the international situation21 or negotiation of claims based on moral rights as distinct from those
based on legally recognized rights.2 No trial is available if the
negotiations fail. This same situation exists when there is a collapse of negotiations aimed at a deal: the transaction aborts,
leaving the parties where they stand. In any event, a trial is an
event contingent upon failure of negotiations. Because trial is
costly, there is some value in avoiding it. Therefore, even in dispute-settlement negotiations, a stage exists at which mutual incentives to avoid trial arise. At that stage, negotiations aimed at
settlement are like negotiations aimed at a deal: there is a net
value to all parties in a consensual resolution if the facts can be
established on which to base that resolution.
The natural conclusion is that every inducement for increased trustworthiness should be fostered. Why then does the
law of professional conduct fail to require disclosure on the part
of lawyers participating in negotiations?
IV.

REGULATION OF TRUSTWORTHINESS

The present regulation of lawyers' trustworthiness is modest. The Code of Professional Responsibility, in DR 7-102(A)(5),

21. See note 8 supra.
22. Negotiations within the legislature may be regarded as negotiations over moral
rights. Such negotiations are backed by the parliamentary sanction of resolution through

majority vote.
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provides that "[iln his representation of a client, a lawyer shall
not.

. .

knowingly make a false statement of law or fact."23 This

provision might be characterized as a minimalist formulation of
the law of disclosure. It prohibits only misrepresentation and requires no affirmative disclosure. It is limited to statements of
"fact" as distinguished from evidence, indications, portents,
opinions, possibilities, or even probabilities of which the lawyer
may be aware. It is limited to matters that are false as distinguished from those of which the lawyer is skeptical or even
suspicious.
The Code of Professional Responsibility contains two other
provisions that augment this basic rule. Yet these standards also
fail affirmatively to require a high level of trustworthiness in
dealing with opposing parties. The first, DR 7-102(A)(3), provides that a lawyer shall not "[c]onceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law to reveal. ' 24 This provision clearly does not go far in the direction of a disclosure
requirement. Instead of specifying the matters that must be revealed, it incorporates by reference general requirements laid
down by the law at large. Thus, rules such as those imposed on
lawyers by securities regulations require affirmative revelations.25 The law of fraud as generally understood requires revelation where necessary to correct a material misstatement when
26
the lawyer has become aware of an inaccuracy.
The second relevant provision is DR 7-102(B)(1), which provides that
[a] lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that
...his client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person ... shall promptly call upon his
client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses ... he shall
reveal the fraud to the affected person . . . except when the

23. ABA

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-102(A)(5) (1977).
24. Id., DR 7-102(A)(3).
25. For example, under securities regulations lawyers are required to make certain
disclosures in their representation of corporate clients. See 15 U.S.C. § 77www (1976);
Lipman, The SEC's Reluctant PoliceForce: A New Role ForLawyers, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV.
a
437, 439 (1974).
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1976). Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 348 (1957)(agent subject to tort liability for fraudulent representation made
on behalf of principal).
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intormation is protected as a privileged communication.

In light of the exception in the last clause, it is doubtful whether
the provision can ever be operative.2 Even if it could be operative, it only applies to fraud and even then only when the fraud
is "clearly" established. Thus the disclosure required by DR 7102(B)(1) is little more than that required for lawyers to escape
complicity in their clients' fraud. If so, the provision is redundant in light of DR 7-102(A)(7), 2' and the net requirement of
the Code of Professional Responsibility is that lawyers avoid
fraudulent representations. Such a precept falls far short of requiring trustworthiness.
Comparison may be made between these provisions and
those promulgated by the American Bar Association Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, familiarly known
as the Kutak Commission. Its provision on this subject, in the
Commission's Proposed Final Draft, May 30, 1981, is as follows:
Rule 4.1 Truthfulness in Statements to Others
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not:
(a) Knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a
third person; or

(b) Knowingly fail to disclose a fact to a third person
when:

(1) In the circumstances failure to make the disclosure is equivalent to making a material misrepresentation;

(2) Disclosure is necessary to prevent assisting a
criminal or fraudulent act, as required by Rule 1.2(d); or
(3) Disclosure is necessary to comply with other

law.30

27. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-102(B)(1) (1977).
28. See G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 21-33 (1978).
29. DR 7-102(A)(7) provides that "[i]n his representation of a client, a lawyer shall
not ...
[c]ounsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or
fraudulent." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-102(A)(7) (1977).
30. ABA COhIM'N ON EVALUATiON OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Proposed Final Draft, May 30, 1981). Proposed Rule 1.2(d) pro-

vides as follows:
A lawyer shall not counsel or assist a client in conduct that the lawyer knows
or reasonably should know is criminal or fraudulent, or in the preparation of a

written instrument containing terms the lawyer knows or leasonably should
know are legally prohibited, but a lawyer may counsel or assist a client in a
good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning, or application of
the law.
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Proposed Rule 4.1(a) corresponds to DR 7-102(A)(5) 31 and
proposed Rule 4.1(b)(1) is a corollary. Proposed Rule 4.1(b)(2)
corresponds to DR 7-102(A)(7). Proposed Rule 4.1(b)(3) corresponds to DR 7-102(A)(3). 32 The onl other difference between
proposed rule 4.1(b) and the provisions of the present Code of
Professional Responsibility concerns the question of preserving
client confidences. The present Code does not explicitly determine whether the disclosure requirement of DR 7-102(A)(3) operates when the required disclosure will reveal adverse information about the client-as it almost inevitably will. The term
"confidences" in the present Code, however, probably does not
include information that effectuates a fraud. 3 The Comment to
proposed Rule 4.1 clarifies this point.
Upon careful consideration, it thus is clear that the Kutak
Commission's proposed rules on trustworthiness do little to alter
the status quo as set forth in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Yet the Commission considered and ultimately rejected a
more sweeping proposal. Its Discussion Draft of January 30,
1980, included the following formulation:
4.2 Fairness to Other Participants

(a) In conducting negotiations a lawyer shall be fair in
dealing with other participants.
(b) A lawyer shall not make a knowing misrepresentation
of fact or law, or fail to disclose a material fact known to the
lawyer, even if adverse, when disclosure is:
(1) Required by law or the Rules of Professional Conduct; or
(2) Necessary to correct a manifest misapprehension
of fact or law resulting from a previous representation
made by the lawyer or known by the lawyer to have been
made by the client ....

Proposed paragraph (a) went well beyond the fraud standard,
prescribing a general requirement that lawyers be "fair." This
certainly encompasses a concept of truthful representations. On
31. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
32. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
33. See 8 J. WIGMORE, TREATISE ON EVIDENCE § 2298 (McNaughton Rev. 1961 &
Supp. 1980); ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 37 (1908).
34. ABA COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 88 (Discussion Draft, Jan.
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the other hand, paragraph (b) restates DR 7-102(A)(5) and subparagraph (b)(1) does not depart radically from the present
Code. Subparagraph (b)(2) parallels the Restatement (Second)
of Agency, which provides that under certain circumstances, if a
lawyer does not correct a manifest misapprehension on the part
of the opposing party, the lawyer could incur civil liability.3 5
Furthermore, the lawyer would probably be guilty, under existing legal principles, of the ethical offense of "assisting" the
client in "illegal" conduct.36
The idea underlying the Kutak Commission's original proposal was not very complicated: the lawyer, as the instrument of
a transaction, should be the guardian of its integrity.3 7 The proposal did not purport to hold lawyers strictly liable for the integrity of transactions or even burden them with a duty of reasonable care. Their only duty was to disclose facts of which an
opposing party was obviously ignorant and which might affect
the integrity of the transaction. 88
Much more fundamental objections were leveled at the proposal, particularly at the requirement that lawyers be "fair."
Many members of the Commission and certainly the Reporter
were surprised at the vehemence of the objections. "Vehemence"
is the correct word, since much more heat than light was forthcoming in the reaction to the proposal. The Commission's surprise was compounded because the proposal seemed appropriate
to the lawyer's role and appeared to reflect one interpretation of
the lawyer's duty as established in the decisional law.3"
Although the explanation of the bar's aversion to the January 1980 proposal is complex, some concerns can be identified.
First, many members of the bar do not realize or are unwilling to
accept the fact that the law at large applies to lawyers. 40 Perhaps these members of the bar believe an immunity attaches to
lawyers against the civil liabilities imposed by the law on other

35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 348, comment c (1957).

36. See Hazard, How FarMay a Lawyer Go in Assisting a Client In Conduct that
U. MAmi L. REV. (1981).
37. See Rubin, supra note 1, at 591.
38. In this regard, use of the term "material facts" in the January 1980 proposal
would have been more precise.
39. See Kutak, Evaluating the Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
Might Be Illegal?, -

1980 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 1016, 1021 n.22.
40. See HAZARD, supra note 28.
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intermediaries such as real estate brokers or securities underwriters. More subtly, perhaps lawyers recognize that the law at
large applies to them but do not wish to be accountable for that
obligation in the context of professional discipline.
Still subtler concerns were involved. The fundamental difficulty appears to stem from the lack of a firm professional consensus regarding the standard of openness that should govern
lawyers' dealings with others and the lack of settled and homogeneous standards of technique in the practice of law.41 This
lack of consensus indicates that lawyers, at least nationally, do
not share a common conception of fairness in the process of negotiation. The lack of this consensus means that lawyers lack the
language to express norms of fairness in negotiation and the institutional means to give effect to these norms.
The underlying disagreement about standards of fairness is
not difficult to understand. Lawyers' standards of fairness are
necessarily derived from those of society as a whole, 42 and subcultural variations are enormous. At one extreme lies the "rural
God-fearing standard," so exacting and tedious that it often excludes the use of lawyers. At the other extreme stands "New
York hardball," now played in most larger cities using the wallto-wall indenture for a playing surface. Between these extremes
are regional and local standards43 and further variations that depend on the business involved, the identity of the participants,
and other circumstances. Against this kaleidoscopic background,
it is difficult to specify a single standard that governs the parties
and thus a correlative standard that should govern their legal
representatives.
The second area of disagreement concerns professional technique. Lawyers differ widely in the technical sophistication they
expect of themselves and of others with whom they deal.44 As a
result, their expectations regarding their own or their opponents'
knowledge in the context of a given transaction may vary widely.
Among practitioners having a very high level of technique, it is

41. See White, supra note 6, at 935-37.
42. See id. at 927.
43. These were brought home to me dramatically when I entered the practice of law
in Oregon after attending law school in New York City.

44. See generally Laumann & Heinz, Specializationand Prestige in the Legal Profession: The Structure of Deference, 1977 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 155.
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expected that a lawyer has carefully investigated and compiled
relevant information, is familiar with recent developments in applicable law, recognizes all tax implications of a transaction, and
anticipates secondary transactions likely to be involved in the
transaction at hand. At another level of technique, lawyers may
use a standard form for a transaction and hope for a satisfactory
result. "
Professional transactions within any given level of technique proceed according to implicitly understood conventions
that allay all but ordinary anxiety on the part of the lawyers.
Professional transactions that combine diverse levels of technique pose much greater difficulties. Lawyers accustomed to less
sophisticated techniques are understandably fearful that they
will be outmatched or even hoodwinked, with the possibility of
loss to their clients and humiliation or even worse for
themselves.
Lawyers accustomed to more sophisticated techniques have
a correlative but perhaps less apparent dilemma. First, signs of
bumbling on the other side cannot necessarily be taken at face
value; there is such a thing as country-slickering and it occurs
even in the city. Second, sophisticated lawyers are at risk precisely because of their technical sophistication. High-level technicians recognize aspects of transactions that lawyers of lesser
sophistication may overlook. But what is to be done with that
knowledge? If it is withheld, the transaction becomes vulnerable
to rescission because of the lawyer's nondisclosure. The lawyer's
professional competence, if not fully deployed for the benefit of
the opposing party, thus becomes a potential infirmity for the
transaction. 6 Conversely, if the lawyer's competence is deployed
for the benefit of the opposing party, where does the deployment
properly stop, short of a takeover of the transaction and4 ,assumption of responsibility for the interests of both parties?
In the ebb and flow of practice, lawyers can and do adjust to
these exigencies. The high level technicians deal with each other

45. See, e.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961).
46. This consideration became pivotal in the Kutak Commission's decision to withdraw proposed Rule 4.1(a) of the Discussion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980.
47. Cf. 329 U.S. at 516 (Jackson, J., concurring)("Discovery was hardly intended to
enable a learned profession to perform its functions either without wits or on wits bor-

rowed from the adversary.").
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with circumspection but confidence. Lawyers in other strata of
the professional community have their own conventions. When
levels are crossed, the less sophisticated lawyer must decide
whether to trust the opponent or to associate someone else, research into the night, or perhaps even abort the transaction. The
more sophisticated lawyer must decide whether to risk later recriminations about the transaction if the bargain is too hard,
whether to make particular disclosures to protect the deal but at
the risk also of killing the deal, or whether to handle the transaction for both sides.
This range of possibilities is difficult to govern by regulation. A rule based on the premise that the legal profession is
substantially homogeneous in technical sophistication would put
the technically sophisticated lawyer in a hopeless dilemma when
dealing with an unsophisticated opposing counsel. Such a lawyer
could straightforwardly be a partisan of his own client unless it
became evident that the other side was inadequately represented. But in that case, the superior technician would have to
assist the other side to guard against the risk of a subsequent
charge of nondisclosure or fraud. Yet until a transaction is well
underway, a lawyer cannot know which course of action is required. At the same time, the lawyer who is unsophisticated or is
simply acting according to his idea of the applicable conventions
of openness would be in jeopardy of giving away his client's position. Thus, in a situation where the opposing lawyers differ substantially in technical sophistication, a rule requiring reciprocal
disclosure could not yield genuine reciprocity.
On the other hand, it would be practically impossible to formulate a general rule that accounts for variations in technical
sophistication. Consider the difficulties with the concept of specialization and with the definition of specialization once the concept was accepted,48 or with the problem of "incompetence"
among the trial bar.49 Could we imagine rules of disclosure that
were based on a distinction between Type A Lawyers and Type
B Lawyers? Anyone who is sanguine about overcoming these difficulties should try drafting the criteria by which to differentiate
the technically sophisticated practitioner from the bar at large.
48. See, e.g., Fromson, The Challenge of Specialization: Professionalism at the
Crossroads,48 N.Y.S.B.J. 540, 542 (1976)..
49. See, e.g., Smith, Peer Review: Its Time Has Come, 66 A.B.A.J. 451 (1980).
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In light of these constraints, legal regulation of trustworthiness cannot go much further than to proscribe fraud. That is
disquieting but not necessarily occasion for despair. It simply indicates limitations on improving the bar by legal regulation. 50

50. Compare Schwartz, The Death and Regeneration of Ethics, 1980 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 953, 960.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol33/iss2/3

16

